view that identification of Aboriginal rights holders should involve the application of Indigenous law, derived from Indigenous governance authority. Canadian courts can, and occasionally do, take account of Indigenous law in rendering decisions, but they inevitably do so within the framework of the Canadian legal system from which they derive their authority, rather than within the context of Indigenous legal orders and governance authority. So when Indigenous people go to or end up in Canadian courts, either by choice or because they have been charged with an offence or sued in a civil action, they find themselves subject to the Canadian law that is applied by the courts. It is therefore essential for them to know how a Canadian court might address the matters at issue, which can include determining the identity of Aboriginal rights claimants.
In this paper, I am going to discuss three categories of decisions: (1)
Aboriginal title cases; (2) Aboriginal rights cases apart from title; and (3) duty to consult cases. My focus is mainly on Supreme Court decisions involving First Nation Indigenous people arising in non-treaty areas. The issue of the identity of Aboriginal title and rights holders can also arise in cases involving the Inuit and the Métis, but there is a scarcity of case law on the issue where the Inuit are concerned, 2 and the unique circumstances of the Métis and the current length of this paper led me to conclude that a separate research paper would be necessary for the issue of the identity of Métis rights holders to be dealt with adequately. Calder was a representative action, brought by Frank Calder and other members of the Nisga'a Nation (referred to as the Nishga Nation and the Nishga Indian Tribe in the case) on behalf of that nation, seeking a
Aboriginal Title Cases
While the matter of the appropriate title holders was not a live issue in Calder and Marshall/Bernard, these decisions are nonetheless relevant and important because they reveal underlying assumptions of the parties and the judges. In allowing the amendment of the representative action to include all members of the three Aboriginal nations whose ancestors had occupied lands along these rivers prior to European colonization, MacFarlane J.A., delivering the unanimous judgment, stated at page 92: "In my opinion, the date at which it must be shown that there was an organized society occupying the specific territory over which the plaintiffs, as descendants of the members of that society, now assert aboriginal title is the date at which sovereignty was asserted by the Europeans. The society need not have been what we now regard as a legal entity, and the descendants of that society need not, in order to have status to bring an action, prove that such a legal entity now exists. Whether the plaintiffs can establish the necessary criteria and show that they are descendants of the members of a society who in common held such aboriginal rights is a matter to be determined on evidence." In a short judgment dismissing an application to rehear the appeal it had already rejected, the Supreme Court observed that, in pronouncing "that the action was personal in nature rather than derivative and the plaintiffs need not establish either the continued existence of the Indian nations nor authority to bring the action…, the Court of Appeal went beyond the narrow issue before them -whether the pleadings were clearly invalid", but the Court decided that those obiter pronouncements did not affect the outcome on that narrow issue and so did not provide grounds for a rehearing (the Supreme Court declined to comment on the correctness of the pronouncements) : [1990] 1 S.C.R. 117 at para. 3. As far as I am aware, this case never went to trial. On the B.C.C.A. decision, see also Olthuis, above note 1 at 11-12. declaration "that the aboriginal title, otherwise known as the Indian title, of the Plaintiffs to their ancient tribal territory hereinbefore described, has never been lawfully extinguished." 8 The trial judge found that the plaintiffs, who were officers of the Nishga Tribal Council and councilors of the four Indian Act bands into which the Nisga'a Nation had been divided, were "appropriate and adequate representatives to bring the action on the part of the Nishga Indian Tribe". 9 They were described by Justice Judson of the Supreme Court of Canada as "descendants of the Indians who have inhabited since time immemorial the territory in question". 10 No one, including the plaintiffs who were members of the Nisga'a band councils, seems to have questioned that, if Aboriginal title existed, it was held by the Nisga'a Nation as a whole, not by the Indian bands or other subgroups within the nation.
However, the consequences of the nation holding title were not addressed, as the Supreme Court refused the declaration because a majority of the judges decided that the action could not be brought against the Crown in right of British Columbia without a fiat (basically, permission) of the Lieutenant
Governor of the province. . 10 Calder, above note 4 at 317. 11 In his dissent, concurred in by Spence and Laskin JJ., Hall J. would have simply issued a declaration that "the appellants' right to possession … and their right to enjoy the fruits of the soil, of the forest, and of the rivers and streams within the boundaries of said lands have not been extinguished": ibid. at 422.
entitled to the benefits of Aboriginal title if they were able to establish that the Mi'kmaq had Aboriginal title to the sites where the cutting of timber took place. However, as the Supreme Court agreed with the trial judges that the accused had not proven that the Mi'kmaq exclusively occupied the sites at the time of the British Crown's assertion of sovereignty, their claim to
Aboriginal title failed. Since they were also unable to convince the judges that they had treaty rights to harvest timber commercially, they were convicted.
In his trial judgment in R. v. Bernard, 12 Justice Lordon seems to have taken for granted that the Miramichi Mi'kmaq, rather than the three Given the absence of an amendment to the pleadings, I must reluctantly conclude that the respondents [British Columbia and Canada] suffered some prejudice. The appellants [the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en] argue that the respondents did not experience prejudice since the collective and individual claims are related to the extent that the territory claimed by each nation is merely the sum of the individual claims of each House; the external boundaries of the collective claims therefore represent the outer boundaries of the outer territories. Although that argument carries considerable weight, it does not address the basic point that the collective claims were simply not in issue at trial. To frame the case in a different manner on appeal would retroactively deny the respondents the opportunity to know the appellants' case.
He found this to be problematic: 25 Although the defect in the pleadings, combined with the mistreatment of the oral histories, prevented the Court from deciding the case on its merits, Lamer C.J.C. nonetheless proceeded to provide guidelines to trial courts on a number of vital issues, including proof, content, infringement, and extinguishment of Aboriginal title. For the purposes of this research paper, the most relevant aspect of his judgment is his apparent acceptance throughout that, if the case had been properly pleaded, Aboriginal title would be held by Aboriginal nations rather than by smaller collectives within nations, such as the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en houses. In a particularly relevant passage, he stated:
A further dimension of Aboriginal title is the fact that it is held communally. Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual Aboriginal persons; it is a collective right to land held by all members of an Aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that land are also made by that community. This is another feature of aboriginal title which is sui generis and distinguishes it from normal property interests.
26
This should not be interpreted to mean that the rights and interests of houses, clans, and other smaller groups are unimportant or lack legal validity.
Instead, I understand it to mean that Aboriginal title is a territorial right vested in the whole nation that applies externally as against the Crown and other persons who are not members of that nation. 27 It is what my colleague 39 See also La Forest J.'s concurring judgment in Delgamuukw, SCC, above note 5 at para. 198, where he suggested that "the presence of two or more aboriginal groups in a territory may also have an impact on continuity of use. For instance, one aboriginal group may have ceded its possession to subsequent occupants or merged its territory with that of another aboriginal society. As well, the occupancy of one aboriginal society may be connected to the occupancy of another society by conquest or exchange. In these circumstances, continuity of use and occupation, extending back to the relevant time, may very well be established." 40 See Tsilhqot'in Nation, BCSC, above note 29 at para. 457: "The political structures may change from time to time. Self identification may shift from band identification to cultural identification depending on the circumstances. What remains constant are the common threads of language, customs, traditions and a shared history that form the central 'self' of a Tsilhqot'in person. The Tsilhqot'in Nation is the community with whom Tsilhqot'in people are connected by those four threads." 41 Ibid. at para. 470. 45 Given these facts, the province contended that "the absence of any traditional pan-Tsilhqot'in governance structure is fatal to any claim on behalf of the Tsilhqot'in Nation." If the law adopted such a position, it might well be devastating to claims by groups such as the Tsilhqot'in. The judge found that Tsilhqot'in decision-making and governance traditionally took place on a localized level, typically within family or encampment groupings, depending on the season. Because of the fluidity of the group structure and the limits of available evidence, however, it would be impossible to trace those localized collectives into modern counterparts. If Aboriginal rights devolve only upon collectives that can show that they are the modern successors of groups that had a clear decisionmaking structure, no one would be able to claim Aboriginal rights on behalf of the Tsilhqot'in. The Supreme Court decided that the alleged right had not been proven, as the evidence of "pre-contact Mohawk trading north of the Canada-United States boundary" was "sparse and tenuous", and trading to the north that did take place was "clearly incidental, and not 
87
With all due respect, I find this conclusion difficult to reconcile with the Crown's admission in Sappier that "wood was gathered at will within the traditional Maliseet territory" and the Court's consequent conclusion that for a declaration of their right to fish commercially in designated waters along the coast of British Columbia.
Delivering the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, Justice Binnie described the action as "the claim of the Lax Kw'alaams First Nation and other First Nations listed in the Appendix to these reasons (herein collectively referred to as 'Lax Kw'alaams'), whose ancestral lands stretch 91 The Court's apparent concern to limit the geographical scope of the right would no doubt be met by the practical reality that members of these First Nations would be unlikely to travel far from their communities to harvest wood if the resource was available closer to home. The Court's confinement of the right to domestic uses would reinforce this practical limitation. 92 Lax Kw'alaams, above note 38. 93 Ibid., style of cause. Although not a case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Garson stated that, in order to succeed in their Aboriginal rights claims, the plaintiffs had to "establish that they are the successor collectives to the Aboriginal groups that possessed Aboriginal rights at the date of contact…. The question to be resolved is whether these modern plaintiffs can prove that they are rights holders; that is, are they connected to the groups from whom they say they derive their Aboriginal rights to fish and to trade in fish."
Ahousaht Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General)
which they claimed to be descended, to be the present-day rights holders in "Aboriginal rights are communal rights, but the rights holder, i.e., the aboriginal group that shares the right may be a family, a clan, a descent group, a hunting party, an encampment, a band, a tribe, a confederacy or a first nation…. Aboriginal rights and treaty rights are collective rights, and the proper party with the standing to assert an aboriginal rights claim or a treaty rights claim is the collective that is the rights holder." In this representative action, Perell J. opined at para. 121 that, if the matter were justiciable (which he decided it was not), the plaintiff chief would be "able to bring a representative action on behalf of the beneficiaries of Treaty 3 provided that: (1) he was authorized to do so by all of the 28 reserve bands (by band council resolutions); or (2) After declining to try to categorize Aboriginal and treaty rights any more precisely along collective and individual lines, LeBel J. concluded:
… on the occasion of this appeal and at this stage of the development of the law, … [i]t will suffice to acknowledge that, despite the critical importance of the collective aspect of Aboriginal and treaty rights, rights may sometimes be assigned to or exercised by individual members of Aboriginal communities, and entitlements may sometimes be created in their favour. In a broad sense, it could be said that these rights might belong to them or that they have an individual aspect regardless of their collective nature. Nothing more need be said at this time.
109
It is clear from the cases we have already examined that individuals can successfully rely on Aboriginal rights as a defence to prosecutions. One would therefore think that they should be able to rely on those rights in civil cases as well. Be that as it may, our concern in this discussion paper is the identity of the current holders of collective rights. In Behn, it seems to have been assumed that the FNFN, an Indian Act band, is the holder of those rights in the area where the logging was taking place. 110 112 Though Sappier/Gray, above note 84, may appear inconsistent with this conclusion, as discussed above in the text accompanying notes 85-91 I think there are problems with this aspect of the decision. The Court's concern seems to have been to limit the territorial scope of the wood harvesting right, but in so doing I think the judges did not take sufficient account of the admissions and evidence regarding the identity of the Aboriginal peoples -the Maliseet and Mi'kmaq peoples -whose pre-contact activities gave rise to the harvesting right. With respect, I think Bastarache J.'s leap in logic in this regard is evident in the following passage at para. 53 of his judgment: "In the Gray trial, the trial judge accepted Mr. Sewell's evidence that the Mi'kmaq had traditionally used the Crown lands in question for the purpose of tree harvesting. The Court of Appeal noted that the Crown did not dispute this finding (para. 15). I would conclude on this basis that Mr. Gray has established an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses on Crown lands traditionally used for this purpose by members of the Pabineau First Nation" [emphasis added]. How, one might ask, does the factual finding that "the Mi'kmaq had traditionally used the Crown lands in question for the purpose of tree harvesting" get transformed into a conclusion relating to "Crown lands traditionally used for this purpose by members of the Pabineau First Nation"? 113 Similarly, in Adams, above note 71, the accused, also an Akwesasne Mohawk, was found to have an Aboriginal right to fish for food in Lake St. Francis in Quebec because fishing there was integral to the distinctive culture of the Mohawks prior to contact with Europeans. Nothing in Lamer C.J.C.'s decision suggests that only the Mohawks of Akwesasne have this right. At para. 34, he stated: "The appellant argues that the Mohawks have an aboriginal right to fish in Lake St. Francis. In order to succeed in this argument the appellant must demonstrate that, pursuant to the test laid out by this Court in Van der Peet, fishing in So far we have examined cases where a claim to Aboriginal title or some other Aboriginal right was asserted and an attempt was made to prove that title or right in court. In other cases, title and other rights are claimed, not in order to get a court declaration of their existence or as a defence against prosecution, but rather to force governments to consult with the Indigenous people concerned before resource development or other activity, such as the building of dams or infrastructure, goes ahead in their territory.
These cases raise the issue of determining whom governments need to consult with in specific instances, which of course depends on the identity of the collectives claiming Aboriginal title or rights at the time when consultation must take place. We will now examine some of these cases. In the Haida Nation case itself, the style of cause described the plaintiffs as the "Council of the Haida Nation and Guujaaw, on their own behalf and on behalf of all members of the Haida Nation". 118 The portion of the declaration of the B.C. Court of Appeal that was affirmed by the Supreme Court declared that the Crown in right of the province has "a legally enforceable duty to the Haida people to consult with them in good faith and to endeavour to seek workable accommodations between the Aboriginal interests of the Haida people, on the one hand, and the short term and long term objectives of the Crown". 119 In the Supreme Court judgment, the duty is said to be owed to the "Haida people", or just the "Haida", as While it is not clear from the judgment that the TRTFN had received authority from the members of the TRTFN to negotiate the land claim and challenge the construction of the road, this was likely assumed, especially as the style of cause indicates that the action was brought by the "Taku River Tlingit First Nation and Melvin Jack, on behalf of himself and all other members of the Taku River Tlingit First Nation".
Duty to Consult Cases

126
Comparing Haida Nation and Taku River, we see that in the former case the duty to consult was owed to the Haida people as a whole, not to their governing bodies which include two Indian Act band councils, whereas
in Taku What is the government to do when faced with a diversity of putative representation on behalf of a First Nation. In my view, the government must discharge its duty to consult by taking reasonable steps to ensure that all points of view within a First Nation are given appropriate consideration.
involved the duty to consult in relation to a proposal to extend a landfill site that could have an adverse impact on Aboriginal rights and title. As the landfill site was on or close to the boundary between the traditional territories of two Aboriginal nations, the Secwepemc Nation The judgment relates to an application by the defendant Minister for an order dismissing the petition on the ground that "the petitioners are without authority to advance the claims or obtain the relief sought, and that they lack the requisite standing to bring the petition." 135 153 Also, the organization or individuals who claim that the duty is owed to them as representatives of the rights or title holding collective must have the authority to act in that capacity on behalf of the collective. 154 In instances where a subgroup within the collective is the custodian or caretaker of the rights or title in question, that subgroup may be able to engage in consultation on behalf of the collective, as Groberman J.A.
suggested in the Court of Appeal decision in Tsilhqot'in Nation. 155 The cases we have examined also reveal that, if unquestioned, the requisite authority is usually assumed from the circumstances, but when challenged it has to be established by evidence. 156 But the Nlaka'pamux Nation decision suggests that, where there are divisions among the rights or title holders or claimants, the duty to consult may be owed to more than one organization representing different interests within the collective. Our analysis of the trial and Court of Appeal decisions in Tsilhqot'in Nation revealed that the judges engaged directly with the issue of the identity of rights and title holders, and decided that the current holder of
Aboriginal rights and title is the Tsilhqot'in Nation as a whole, not Indian Act bands. This conclusion, which does not appear to have been challenged by any of the parties on appeal to the Supreme Court, was implicitly affirmed by the Court's declaration of the Tsilhqot'in Nation's Aboriginal title. However, I do not understand this to mean that rights and title will be vested in Aboriginal nations in every instance; instead, it depends on the evidence. At trial in Tsilhqot'in Nation, Justice Vickers stated that the inquiry into the identity of the rights and title holders "is primarily a matter of fact to be determined on the whole of the evidence relating to the specific society or culture." 158 He found that the "Tsilhqot'in people were the historic community of people sharing language, customs, traditions, historical experience, territory and resources at the time of first contact and at sovereignty assertion." 159 Any rights of individuals or subgroups were derived from the collective actions, traditions, and experience of the Tsilhqot'in Nation. 160 Tsilhqot'in people make no distinction amongst themselves at the band level as to their individual right to harvest resources. The evidence is that, as between Tsilhqot'in people, any person in the group can hunt or fish anywhere inside Tsilhqot'in territory. The right to harvest resides in the collective Tsilhqot'in community. Individual community members identify as Tsilhqot'in people first, rather than as band members.
Although an Aboriginal rights rather than a title case (title was That viewpoint needs to be demonstrated by evidence. Given that determination of the question of who has rights is at least partly a matter of law, this suggests that Indigenous law is relevant to answer this question. 164 Ahousaht Indian Band, BCSC, above note 71at para. 7. 165 Tsilhqot'in Nation, BCCA, above note 29 at para. 149.
But because Canadian judges are generally unfamiliar with Indigenous law and cannot access it through conventional legal research, it has to be presented to them mainly through testimony by Indigenous people who are acknowledged in their communities as the authorities on that law.
Once the collective holder of Aboriginal rights or title has been identified, one needs to consider who can exercise those rights or enjoy the benefits of that title, and on what terms. 166 The kinds of rights involved, whether rights to hunt, fish, occupy and use land, and so on, generally cannot be enjoyed and exercised by a collective as such; instead, they are enjoyed and exercised by individuals, families, and other smaller groups.
Given that the collective is necessarily made up of individual members, it is essential to be able to determine who the members are. As Vickers J.
observed in Tsilhqot'in Nation, this is an internal matter to be decided by the collective: "Membership is identified by the community. It should always be the particular Aboriginal community that determines its own membership." 167 In my opinion, all this leads inevitably to the conclusion that the rights or title holding collective must have governmental authority.
Governmental structures and powers are obviously necessary for a community to make collective decisions about how its communal rights are to be allocated and managed. 169 Determinations about membership in the community also involve the exercise of governmental authority. This matter of governance was put before the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw, but the Court declined to consider it, sending the matter back to trial along with the issue of the existence of Aboriginal title. 170 But now, with the declaration of collective Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot'in Nation, the matter can no longer be avoided. In the absence of guidance from Canadian courts, Indigenous peoples can take the initiative in exercising their governance authority. In the Tsilhqot'in Nation judgment, the Supreme Court expanded the authority of the provinces over Aboriginal title lands by discarding the application of the doctrine on interjurisdictional immunity in this context. 171 One reason the Court gave for doing so was to avoid a legal vacuum. 172 But given that Indigenous peoples have their own laws in relation to their title lands and the exercise of other Aboriginal rights, there is no legal vacuum. 173 By exercising their governmental authority and ensuring that their laws are respected, Indigenous peoples can "pro-actively use and manage" their title lands, as the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot'in Nation said they have a right to do. 174 
